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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IF IT’S NOT BROKE, DON’T FIX IT: IGNORING CRITICISMS OF
SUPREME COURT RECUSALS
INTRODUCTION
An impartial decision-maker is essential to the American notion of justice.
The Declaration of Independence listed the lack of judicial independence as
one of the American people’s primary grievances.1 Since 1789, Supreme Court
Justices have taken an oath to “administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and rich, and [to] faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all [their] duties . . . .”2 Courthouses around the country
display a blindfolded Lady Justice to represent that justice is “even-handed and
equally administered to all, irrespective of any and all considerations.”3
Recusal is one tool used to ensure that Supreme Court Justices are the
impartial decision-makers that litigants and the public expect. Public opinion
matters because the Supreme Court is unlike the other branches of government,
which derive authority from the electoral process.4 The Court’s only authority
is its institutional authority, which depends on its ability to command the
respect and trust of the public.5 The public will only respect and trust Supreme
Court opinions if “the American people believe [the Justices] to be impartial
and above any particular political or financial interests.”6 If the public believes
that the Justices have a personal or political agenda, then the public will be less

1. “The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.
. . . He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 11 (U.S.
1776).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).
3. Koppelman v. C.I.R., 202 F.2d 955, 956 (3d. Cir. 1953).
4. Jeffrey Rosen, Larry Kramer, Sandra Day O’Connor, Stephen Breyer, Does the Supreme
Court Follow the People? at 14 (Aspen Idea Festival 2011) [hereinafter Does the Supreme Court
Follow the People?] (transcript available at http://www.aifestival.org/sites/default/files/tran
scripts/AIF11_050_does_SCOTUS_follow_public.pdf).
5. Id.
6. Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy et al. to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy], in Eric
Lichtblau, Democrats Seek to Impose Tougher Supreme Court Ethics, THE CAUCUS BLOG (Sept.
8, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/democrats-seek-to-imposetougher-supreme-court-ethics/.
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willing to accept the Court’s decisions and the integrity and legitimacy of the
Court will be harmed.7
The Supreme Court recusal process seems to become part of mainstream
media when the line between justice and politics becomes blurred. For
example, in 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney was named in his official
capacity as the Vice President of the United States and Chairman of the
Cheney Energy Task Force as a defendant in a case before the Supreme Court.8
About three weeks after the Court granted certiorari, Justice Antonin Scalia
and Cheney went on a duck-hunting trip together.9 A journalist at the L.A.
Times broke the news about the trip,10 and news outlets across the nation
picked up the story.11 Details about the trip’s length, travel arrangements,
lodging, financing, and other attendees leaked out bit by bit.12 Political
cartoons and late-night monologues followed.13 Senators Patrick Leahy and
Joseph Lieberman wrote to Chief Justice William Rehnquist asking about the
High Court’s policies on conflict of interest: “When a sitting judge, poised to
hear a case involving a particular litigant, goes on vacation with that litigant,
reasonable people will question whether that judge can be a fair and impartial
adjudicator of that man’s case or his opponent’s claims.”14 By the time a
motion asking Justice Scalia to recuse himself was filed, twenty of the thirty
largest newspapers in America had explicitly called on Justice Scalia to
disqualify himself.15 Not a single newspaper had argued against
disqualification.16 “[T]he American public . . . ha[d] unanimously concluded
that there is an appearance of favoritism . . . which mandates recusal . . . .”17
7. Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court Justices, NPR (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/bill-puts-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-courtjustices.
8. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 918 (2004).
9. Mot. to Recuse at 2, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03475).
10. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 572–73 (2005) (citing David Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts
Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A1).
11. Totenberg, supra note 7.
12. Frost, supra note 10, at 577.
13. Mot. to Recuse, supra note 9, at 5–6.
14. Frost, supra note 10, at 574 (quoting Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, to The Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States (Jan. 22, 2004)). Chief Justice Rehnquist was not amused by their inquiry. Frost,
supra note 10, at 574. Rehnquist responded to their letter by chastising the Senators for criticizing
the actions of a Justice while the case was pending, instead of waiting until the case had been
decided. Id.
15. Mot. to Recuse, supra note 9, at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3–4.
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Several weeks later, Justice Scalia issued a twenty-one-page memorandum
defending his decision not to recuse.18
Debate over Supreme Court recusals ignited anew surrounding the Obama
administration’s health care reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”). Health care has been a particularly
polarizing issue in American politics in recent years.19 Those on all sides of the
dispute expected the new law to ultimately reach the Supreme Court.20 It was
inevitable that the Justices were going to be “drawn into the political fray.”21
And with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to hear the constitutional
challenges to the law, calls for the self-recusal of Justice Elena Kagan and
Justice Clarence Thomas intensified.22
Justice Kagan was urged to recuse herself because of her previous position
as U.S. Solicitor General, the federal government’s top lawyer at the Supreme
Court.23 Kagan was notified by the White House in March 2010, just before the
Affordable Care Act was passed, that she was under consideration to be named
to the Supreme Court.24 Upon learning this, Kagan stated she then abstained
from discussing the inevitable legal challenges to the health care reform law
with the White House and the Justice Department.25 She said she attended only
one meeting where the litigation was briefly mentioned and none where the
litigation was substantively discussed.26 Kagan also said she was never asked
her opinion about the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, or the
underlying legal issues in the litigation.27 Nor had she ever reviewed
government documents.28 Additionally, Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. said
lawyers went out of their way to keep from involving Kagan in the
discussions.29 The political right, however, questioned the effectiveness of the

18. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
19. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Health Care and Recusal Politics, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28,
2011, 12:25 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/analysis-health-care-and-recusal-politics/.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on March 26−28, 2011. Lyle Denniston, Court
Sets 5½-Hour Hearing on Heatlh Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:49 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/court-sets-5-12-hour-hearing-on-health-care/.
23. Robert Barnes, Health-Care Case Brings Fight over Which Supreme Court Justices
Should Decide It, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/healthcare-case-brings-fight-over-which-supreme-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11/22/gIQAw
RWb2N_story.html.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Barnes, supra note 23.
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“Chinese wall.”30 Emails released following a Freedom of Information Act
request show Kagan wanted the Solicitor General’s office involved in strategy
decisions regarding the health care reform law and also show her personal
enthusiasm for the law.31
Justice Thomas was urged to recuse himself as well. His wife, Virginia
Thomas, was an outspoken opponent of the Affordable Care Act; before she
stepped down as the CEO of Liberty Central, its website characterized the law
as “tyranny” and demanded the repeal of “ObamaCare.”32 Virginia Thomas
received financial contributions for her advocacy from well-known
conservative donors with whom Justice Thomas has also been associated.33
Justice Thomas had also spoken at events sponsored by organizations opposed
to the Affordable Care Act.34 Combined, these reasons led critics to question
whether Justice Thomas could maintain the appearance of impartiality when
the Affordable Care Act comes before the Court.35
The demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves came
against a backdrop of intense criticism of Supreme Court ethics by members of
Congress, the legal community, and advocacy groups.36 Some members of
Congress feared the public’s faith in the judicial system and the integrity of the
country’s highest court had been eroded “after several recent questionable
actions by some of its members” and “alarming reports” of Justices fundraising
for political organizations.37 In March 2011, Representative Christopher
Murphy from Connecticut sponsored “The Supreme Court Transparency and
Disclosure Act of 2011,” (the “Murphy Bill”) which seeks, in part, to amend
the recusal process.38 The bill calls for Justices to publicly disclose their
reasons for disqualifying themselves sua sponte or in response to a party’s
motion, and also their reasons for refusing recusal and instead remaining on a
case.39 The bill also seeks the creation of a process to further review any such
refusals to recuse.40

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Steven Lubet, Let the Justices Be the Judge, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles.
Chicagotribune.com/2010-10-27/news/ct-oped-1027-activism-20101027_1_health-care-justiceelena-kagan-supreme-court-justices.
33. Denniston, supra note 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lyle Denniston, A Defense of Justices’ Ethics, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 31, 2010, 6:01 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/a-defense-of-justices-ethics/.
37. Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy, supra note 6.
38. H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
39. Id.
40. Id. at § 3(b).
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Similarly, a group of over one hundred law professors from around the
United States sent a letter to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in
March 2011 calling for transparent, reviewable Supreme Court recusal
decisions.41 The professors criticized the Supreme Court’s non-reviewable
recusal decisions, which they claim “turn solely on the silent opinion of the
challenged justice,” for eroding public confidence in the Court and harming the
integrity and legitimacy of the Supreme Court.42 The professors pointed to
Lord Coke’s seventeenth century articulation that “no man may be a judge in
his own case,” and lamented that “inexplicably we still allow Supreme Court
justices to be the sole judge of themselves on recusal issues.”43
Both the demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves
and the proposals for revising the recusal statute are misguided, however.
Without considering historical evidence or current facts, critics have bought
into the media frenzy, indulged doubts about the integrity of Supreme Court
Justices,44 and ignored assurances from parties who are actually informed
about the mechanics of the Court and recusal.
Part I of this paper discusses the history of the federal recusal statute. Part
II describes the criticisms of the recusal statute and proposed revisions and
explains why this is a situation in which the cures are worse than the disease.
Finally, Part III presents the argument that current criticisms of the recusal
process are misguided and no revision of the process is necessary.
I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RECUSAL STATUTE
Under English common law, there was no recusal for bias.45 It was
understood that part of a judge’s job was to set aside personal interests and
biases, “to rise above personal considerations,” and to decide the case on the
merits.46 In America, Congress has set the standard for judicial recusal since
1792. The first federal recusal statute required a judge to remove himself from
a case when he was “concerned in interest, or ha[d] been of counsel for either
party.”47 However, similar to English common law, the statute did not prohibit

41. Letter from Mark N. Anderson et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter “Letter from Law Professors”], available at http://www.afj.
org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 10-13, 15-17 and accompanying text.
45. See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1096
(2004) (contrasting with U.S. recusal statutes).
46. Id.
47. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278 (“That in all suits and actions in any district
court of the United states, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways,
concerned in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, it shall be the duty of such judge on
application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the minutes of the court, and also to
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judges from hearing cases in which they might be biased against, or in favor
of, one of the parties.48 For example, Marbury v. Madison, “our legal culture’s
most revered judicial decision,” might have been resolved differently, and the
Constitutional Law experience of every law student changed, had the recusal
statute contained more than two specific grounds for judicial qualification.49
William Marbury had been appointed by President John Adams to serve as
Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia.50 After President Adams
signed Marbury’s commission, Secretary of State John Marshall sealed it.51
But Marbury’s commission was never delivered because Marshall left it
behind in his desk as he departed the Secretary of State’s office to become
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,52 and Marbury petitioned the Supreme
Court to force the new Secretary of State to deliver the commission.53 Chief
Justice Marshall not only caused the litigation, he authored the opinion and
determined its outcome.54
Recusal for bias became part of the statute in 1821 when the recusal
standard was expanded to require a judge to recuse himself when, in his
opinion, he had a relation or connection to a party that would make it improper
to sit.55 In 1911, Congress broadened the recusal statute again and required a

order an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceedings in such suit or action, to be forthwith
certified to the next circuit court of the district, which circuit court shall, thereupon, take
cognizance thereof, in the like manner, as if it had been originally commenced in that court, and
shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly.”).
48. Id.
49. Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994).
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137–38 (1803).
51. Id. at 138.
52. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1390.
53. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137–38.
54. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1390.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (“That in all suits and actions in any district court
of the United states, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways, concerned
in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, or is so related to, or connected with, either
party as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of such suit or action, it
shall be the duty of such judge, on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on
the records of the court; and, also, an order that an authenticated copy thereof, with all the
proceedings in such suit or action, shall be forthwith certified to the next circuit court of the
district; and if there be no circuit court in such district, to the next circuit court in the state; and if
there be no circuit court in such state, to the most convenient circuit court in an adjacent state;
which circuit court shall, upon such record being filed with the clerk thereof, take cognisance
thereof, in the like manner as if such suit or action had been originally commenced in that court,
and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly; and the jurisdiction of such circuit
court shall extend to all such cases so removed, as were cognisable in the district court from
which the same was removed.”).
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judge to recuse himself when he was a material witness for either party.56 In
1948, the recusal statute was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455,57 and Congress made
several more changes. First, the statute was amended to apply to “[a]ny justice
of judge of the United States,”58 while previous versions of the statute applied
only to district court judges.59 Supreme Court recusals were now covered by
the statute. Second, Congress added that it was improper for a judge to sit on a
case not only when the judge had a relation or connection to a party, but also a
relation or connection to a party’s attorney.60 Third, it was no longer required
that a party seek the judge’s disqualification before the judge had to remove
himself; judges were now under an obligation to recuse themselves when they
knew of their own partiality.61 Finally, Congress uncharacteristically narrowed
the recusal statute by qualifying that a judge’s interest in a case must be
“substantial” in order to warrant recusal.62
Generally speaking, by 1948, the recusal statute required nothing more
than it had in 1821—a judge was prohibited from presiding when he had an
interest in the case or a relationship to a party. The statute was simply not as
effective as Congress had intended.63 The recusal determination was entirely
subjective—a judge personally decided, “in his opinion,” whether an interest
or relationship made it improper to sit.64 The statute was “indefinite and
ambiguous” and provided little guidance to judges making a recusal

56. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (“Whenever it appears that the
judge of any district court is in any way concerned in interest in any suit pending therein, or has
been of counsel or is a material witness for either party, or is so related to or connected with
either party as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, it shall be his duty,
on application by either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the records of the court; and also
an order that an authenticated copy thereof shall be forthwith certified to the senior circuit judge
for said circuit then present in the circuit; and thereupon such proceedings shall be had as are
provided in section fourteen.”).
57. FED. JUD. CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASELAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144 at 2
(2002) (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908) (“Any justice or judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has
been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party
or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein.”).
58. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455)
(amended 1974).
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090; Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat.
643.
60. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 1–2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352.
64. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 2.
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determination.65 Judges were able to narrowly construe the mandatory grounds
for disqualification to limit the reach of the recusal statute.66 Judges also
created a “duty to sit” and would resolve close disqualification issues against
recusal based on the obligation to decide the cases to which judges were
assigned.67 Congress felt that § 455 weakened the public’s confidence in the
judicial system.68
In 1974, Congress “made massive changes” to § 455 to broaden and clarify
the grounds for judicial disqualification.69 The one-paragraph statute was
transformed into a lengthy statute with multiple sections, subsections, and
subsections to the subsections.70
Subsection (a) was “an entirely new ‘catchall’ provision” incorporated into
§ 45571 intended “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
process.”72 It required recusal when the justice’s “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”73 Subsection (a) replaced the subjective standard of
the 1948 recusal statute and required judges to evaluate their interests,
relationships, biases, and prejudices on an objective basis “from the
perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding
facts and circumstances.”74 “The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can
‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be made in light of the facts as they existed,
and not as they were surmised or reported.”75 What matters under § 455(a) is
“not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”76
The language of subsection (a) also had the effect of abolishing the duty to
sit77 which judges relied on to deny requests for recusal in “all but the most

65. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 2 (“These statutory and ethical provisions proved to be not
only indefinite and ambiguous, but also, in certain situations, conflicting. The uncertainty of who
was a ‘near relative’ or of when the judge was ‘so related’ caused problems in application of both
the statutory and the ethical standards. While the Canon required disqualification for involvement
of ‘his personal interests’, the statute required such action only when it was ‘a substantial
interest.’”).
66. Frost, supra note 10, at 541 (citing Randal J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of
Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 239 (1978)).
67. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 2.
68. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 2.
69. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994).
70. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609.
71. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
72. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
74. Id.; Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004).
75. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 914.
76. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000).
77. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
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blatant circumstances.”78 The duty to sit was replaced by a “presumption of
disqualification.”79 When there was a reasonable factual basis for doubting a
judge’s impartiality, the judge was to disqualify himself.80 Congress made
clear that close cases were to be resolved in favor of disqualification.81 The
House Report to the Judiciary noted it was unanimously agreed that
eliminating the duty to sit “would enhance public confidence in the impartiality
of the judicial system.”82
Subsection (b) of the amended statute focused on the “interest” and
“relationship” elements of the 1948 recusal statute and provided specific,
objective instances in which recusal was necessary.83 Congress sought to
eliminate the ambiguous and uncertain language of the 1948 statute to help
judges avoid criticism for failure to disqualify themselves.84 There are now
five specific situations in which recusal is mandatory and cannot be waived. A
judge must recuse for personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of the facts.85 Recusal is also required when the judge, or a lawyer
with whom the judge previously practiced law, has served as a lawyer or
material witness in the matter in controversy.86 The judge is required to recuse
when they or their family has a financial interest in the proceeding.87 Recusal
is also required when the judge or their family is a party, a lawyer, or a
witness, or has some other substantial interest in the proceeding.88 Finally,
recusal is required when the judge was previously employed by the
government and participated as a judge, counsel, advisor, or material witness
in the proceeding, or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
proceeding.89

78. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to
Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 864 (2009) (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 604–05 (2d ed. 2007)).
79. Stempel, supra note 78, at 864.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4.
81. Stempel, supra note 78, at 866.
82. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4. However, Supreme Court Justices in particular continue to
evoke the “duty to sit.” See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004).;
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9
(2012).
83. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 5.
84. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 1–2.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 6.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE RECUSAL PROCESS, POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS, AND
PROBLEMS WITH THE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
For over 200 years, Congress has tinkered with the substantive aspect of
the recusal standard and the grounds which demand recusal.90 Current
criticisms, however, take aim at the procedural aspects of the recusal standard
and the lack of basic procedural elements. Under the current recusal statute, §
455, recusal is an “ad hoc and informal process.”91 Decisions are not
transparent or reviewable.92 “[W]e are just left believing the word of the
[J]ustices.”93 The recusal process is missing basic procedural elements
typically viewed as indispensable to democratic adjudication.94 This paper
focuses on two of them: the lack of a neutral decision-maker and the lack of a
written explanation for decisions.95
A.

Lack of a Neutral Decision-Maker

One point of general agreement in the justice system is that “no man may
be a judge in his own case.”96 Yet at the Supreme Court the decision to recuse
has always rested with each individual Justice, and there is no process
available to review that decision.97 Scholars have criticized the recusal
practice,98 the media has questioned the wisdom of it,99 and the Court itself has
even expressed skepticism that “the sole trier of fact is the one accused of
bias.”100 Critics argue that leaving the recusal decision wholly up to the very
Justice being asked to disqualify him or herself is problematic because it is
unrealistic to expect anyone to be able to candidly assess the extent of their

90. Frost, supra note 10, at 533–34. Professor Frost argues that it has never been effective to
alter the substance of the recusal standard because each time Congress has broadened the recusal
standard, it has been narrowed as the members of the judiciary apply it to themselves. Id. at 534.
“The very self-dealing that makes recusal necessary in the first place has operated to prevent
disqualification statutes from being employed as fully and broadly as Congress intended.” Id.
91. Id. at 536.
92. Letter from Law Professors, supra note 41.
93. Totenberg, supra note 7.
94. Frost, supra note 10, at 535–36.
95. For procedural elements not discussed by this paper, see Frost, supra note 10, at 557–65
96. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592–93
(1987) (quoting Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 114a (C.P.) 118a (quoting Lord Coke)).
97. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void
in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 109 (2004).
98. Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the
United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV.
181, 217 n.191 (2005).
99. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Odd Court Routine: Being the Judge of Whether to Be the Judge,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE
FDE153AF935A25752C1A9669D8B63.
100. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009).
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own bias.101 Judge Richard Posner thinks it is especially problematic when it
comes to Supreme Court Justices.102 “Cocooned in their marble palace,
attended by sycophantic staff, and treated with extreme deference wherever
they go, Supreme Court Justices are at risk of acquiring an exaggerated opinion
of their ability and character.”103 Judges are human and certainly make
mistakes, and decisions to recuse are no exception.104 But on the United States
Supreme Court—the court of last resort, critics find the mistakes particularly
troublesome because there is no recourse.105
One of the more popular suggestions for reforming the recusal process is to
make the Justices’ recusal decisions reviewable.106 Some commentators have
advocated allowing the Justice who is the target of the motion to recuse to
continue to make the initial determination; if the Justice refuses to recuse, one
or more of the remaining eight Justices should review the decision.107
Similarly, the Murphy Bill108 recommends that the Justices review each others’
refusals to recuse, and also proposes that retired Justices and/or federal district
court, circuit court, and senior judges could review Supreme Court refusals to
recuse.109 Advocates of the review process believe that it will ensure the
recusal decision is handled objectively from those in a better position to
evaluate the arguments, and the decision will be more respected by the
public.110
There are some problems, however, with the suggestion to make Supreme
Court recusal decisions reviewable. To begin with, having lower court judges
review a Supreme Court Justice’s decision is unworkable and potentially
unconstitutional. Herman Schwartz, an American University law professor

101. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
22 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Assoc. Dean of Research, Prof. of
Law, Ind. Univ.); see also Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 227 (2010)
(noting the West Virginia judge in Caperton “overestimated his own objectivity while failing to
realize how others would react to his decision.”).
102. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 306 (2008).
103. Id.
104. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2265 (2009).
105. Russell Wheeler, Regulating Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics: “Cures Worse Than the
Disease?”, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0321_
justices_ethics_wheeler.aspx.
106. Lubet, supra note 101, at 228 (“When it comes to disqualification, it takes more than a
single judge to render a fair decision. It takes a court.”); Roberts, supra note 97, at 171–73; Frost,
supra note 10, at 584.
107. Hearing, supra note 101, at 22 (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Assoc. Dean of Research,
Prof. of Law, Ind. Univ.); Roberts, supra note 97, at 169.
108. See Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy, supra note 6.
109. H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
110. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 97, at 171.
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who signed the letter to Congress asking for mandatory and enforceable ethical
rules for the Supreme Court,111 called the Murphy Bill “clearly very
flawed.”112 He added that “no lower court judge would dare say [J]ustice soand-so should have recused him or herself.”113 Additionally, the denial of a
recusal motion is a judicial act, and Supreme Court judicial acts are not subject
to appeal.114 Authorizing a party to “seek further review”115 of a Supreme
Court Justice’s denial of a motion to recuse is the same thing as permitting an
appeal, and it results in the creation of a court higher than the Supreme Court,
which violates the Constitutional mandate of “one supreme Court.”116
“[E]stablishing any sort of supervisory body over the Supreme Court, even a
supervisory body made of themselves, would fundamentally change the
principle of judicial independence.”117
Another problem with having the Justices review each other’s recusal
decisions is it could “make for awkward intra-Justice relations,”118 or even
worse, destroy the collegiality of the Court.119 Justice Kagan has called the
Supreme Court “an incredibly collegial and warm institution.”120 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg told her law school classmates at their fifty-year reunion that
the Supreme Court is “the most collegial place I have ever worked.”121
Collegiality at the Supreme Court goes beyond mutual understanding, respect,
and working toward a common goal: the Justices are genuine friends. As
Justice Ginsburg stated, “despite our sharp differences on certain issues . . . we
remain good friends, people who respect each other and genuinely enjoy each
other’s company.”122 The Justices make it a point to each lunch together every
day they are at the Court.123 Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and former
Chief Justice William Rehnquist were friends for over fifty years and shared
backyard barbeques and family vacations.124 Justice Ginsburg and Justice

111. See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
112. Totenberg, supra note 7.
113. Id.
114. Wheeler, supra note 105.
115. H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
116. Id.; Totenberg, supra note 7.
117. Totenberg, supra note 7.
118. Roberts, supra note 97, at 171.
119. See supra notes 115–16.
120. Andre Salvail, Justice Kagan Speaks of Life on the Highest Court, ASPEN TIMES (Aug.
3, 2011), http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20110803/NEWS/110809970.
121. Press Release, Columbia Law School, Disagreements at Supreme Court Confined to
Opinions, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ‘59 Says (June 20, 2009), http://www.law.columbia.edu/
media_inquiries/news_events/2009/june2009/ginsburg.
122. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN.
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2004).
123. Id. at 1034.
124. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 3 (2007).
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Scalia, along with their spouses, have spent every New Year’s Eve together for
over twenty years.125 Justice Clarence Thomas is “universally adored” by his
fellow Justices, and he and Justice Breyer often whisper, joke, and pass notes
mocking one another during oral arguments.126
Camaraderie and collegiality is highly valued at the Supreme Court,127
where Justices are appointed for life, sit on cases with one another year after
year,128 “and seek to forge coalitions from term to term.”129 “[It is a] difficult
task [to pass] upon the integrity of a fellow member of the bench,”130 and the
Justices will be hesitant to institute a review policy that might be viewed as
disrespectful to one another. It is a long-established and time-honored tradition
of the Court to allow Justices to individually decide whether or not to sit in any
case.131 “Once a Justice has made a judgment, the other Justices are not going
to publicly review that and say, ‘You done wrong.’”132 Justices will be
additionally hesitant to institute a review policy because no other federal court
requires its members to sit in judgment of each other’s recusal decisions.133
A third problem with the creation of a formal review process is it is based
on a fallacy that the Justices make recusal decisions without consulting
anyone. In his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice

125. Joan Biskupic, Scalia, Ginsburg Strike a Balance, USA TODAY (Dec. 25, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-25-ginsburg-scalia_N.htm.
126. TOOBIN, supra note 124, at 103–04.
127. Justice Elena Kagan told the Aspen Institute, “I don’t want to say that it’s like you have
an incentive to like each other. I think that you can live in an institution happily or you can live in
an institution sadly. You can live with people respectfully or you can live with people without
that. If you are going to be some place for a long time, boy, it makes you value collegiality.”
Carolyn Sackariason, Kagan Reflects on First Year as Supreme Court Justice, ASPEN DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.aspendailynews.com/section/home/148362.
128. TOOBIN, supra note 124, at 23 (“The Court is defined more by continuity than by
change.”).
129. Frost, supra note 10, at 552.
130. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988).
131. In his response to Senators Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman’s concerns about
Justice Scalia sitting in the Cheney case, former Chief Justice Rehnquist said, “[T]here is no
formal procedure for Court review of the decision of a Justice in an individual case. That is so
because it has long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question for himself.” David
G. Savage, High Court Won’t Review Scalia’s Recusal Decision, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2004),
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/27/nation/na-duck27; Goodson, supra note 98, at 217 (“[T]he
tradition of permitting each Justice to make his or her own decision on recusal is firmly
entrenched in the Supreme Court. Even when parties have attempted to outmaneuver the practice
by addressing their recusal motion to the full Court, the challenged Justice has solely decided the
motion.”).
132. Totenberg, supra note 7.
133. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 8.
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Roberts reiterated what Justices have long been saying: they consult a wide
variety of authority to resolve ethical issues, including issues of recusal.134
First, and foremost, the Justices informally consult one another.135 After
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s death, the Library of Congress opened his papers
to the public, and it was revealed that in 1984, when Marshall decided he no
longer wanted to recuse himself in cases in which the NAACP participated, he
sent a memo to his fellow justices seeking their advice.136 In 1993, the Justices
consulted with one another regarding recusal when a relative’s firm was
involved in a case before the Court, and they issued a “Statement of Recusal
Policy” detailing their views.137 In 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a
statement when he refused to recuse himself in Microsoft and stated he had
“reviewed the relevant legal authorities and consulted with [his] colleagues.”138
Justice John Paul Stevens told the Washington Post that in 2003 he considered
recusing himself in Grutter v. Bollinger because the dean of the University of
Michigan law school was one of his former law clerks; however, in keeping
with the usual practice on the Court, he consulted his colleagues, and they
“unanimously and very firmly” told him not to recuse.139 In 2004, Justice
Ginsburg told the University of Connecticut School of Law, “[i]n the end it is a
decision the individual Justice makes, but always with consultation among the
rest of us.”140
Aside from consulting one another when making recusal decisions, the
Justices also consult precedent and consider treatises, scholarly publications,
and disciplinary decisions.141 The Justices seek advice from the Court’s Legal
Office. 142 They present questions to the Judicial Conference’s Committee on
Codes of Conduct, which gives informal advice and written opinions to help
judges comply with ethical principles. 143 The Justices also consult with law
professors and ethics experts.144

134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 81–82 (2006).
137. Id.
138. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000).
139. Davies, supra note 136, at 91.
140. Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 1039 (emphasis added).
141. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 5.
142. Id.
143. Judge Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit spoke about the “Dear Abby Committee”
to the House Committee on the Judiciary and explained they are an “ethics service center, and a
sounding board to help judges try to comply with th[e] wide array of ethical principles.” Hearing,
supra note 101, at 7 (statement of Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, J., 9th Cir.). Judges can ask the
Committee for informal advice and if that is not sufficient, judges can ask for a written opinion.
Id. The Committee responds to over one thousand informal requests for advice each year and it
issues over one hundred formal opinions. Id. Additionally, there are more than 80 publicly
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Creating a process to review Supreme Court recusal decisions is a
dangerous proposition because it is potentially unconstitutional and could
change the collegial atmosphere of the Court. And if critics would only listen
to the Justices, they would see that it is also unnecessary for the purpose of
ensuring the decision is objective.
B.

Lack of a Written Explanation

Courts gain legitimacy by explaining the reasoning for their decisions.145
An explanation demonstrates that a judge’s decision was deliberate,
dispassionate, rational, and based on law, as opposed to being a gut reaction,
arbitrary, or based on personal preferences.146 Explanations also contribute to
the creation of a body of caselaw, which is useful for standardizing decisionmaking, minimizing inconsistencies, and promoting predictability.147
The Supreme Court’s recusal practices are not well understood. When a
litigant files a motion to recuse, the Justice’s decision is memorialized as a one
page, typically one-sentence, unpublished order directed to the parties.148
When a Justice recuses sua sponte, a short statement appears in the case report
that the Justice took no part in the decision being reported.149 Justices rarely
issue substantive opinions explaining their decision not to recuse,150 and it is
virtually unprecedented for a Justice to issue an opinion justifying recusal.151
As a result, Justices take a “hodgepodge of approaches”,152 and recusals at the
Supreme Court are “sometimes rigorous, sometimes idiosyncratic, and often

available advisory opinions, many which speak to recusal. Id. The situation was summarized by
the following: “[J]udges want to do the right thing. They wouldn’t call on us otherwise.” Id. at 15.
144. Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of J. Stephen Breyer), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=8bbe59e76fc0b6747b22c32c9e014187.
145. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).(“To bring
coherence to the [judicial] process, and to seek respect for the resulting judgment, judges often
explain the reasons for their conclusions and rulings.”).
146. Frost, supra note 10, at 561–62.
147. Id. at 564.
148. Stempel, supra note 96, at 641.
149. Id. at 642.
150. Frost, supra note 10, at 569.
151. Id. at 570–71. But see Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466–67
(1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (explaining the Justice recused himself because he was so strongly against
the radio being played in public transportation. He said, “My feelings are so strongly engaged as a
victim of the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon
it.”).
152. The Diane Rehm Show: Conflict of Interest on the Supreme Court, NPR (Aug. 25, 2011)
(transcript available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-08-25/conflict-interest-supremecourt/transcript).
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quite mysterious.153 Critics argue that the lack of transparency undermines the
very purpose of the recusal statute, which is to promote public confidence in
impartiality of the judiciary.154
Critics want the Justices to issue written statements explaining their
reasons when they recuse themselves, both sua sponte and in response to a
party motion, and their reasons when they refuse to recuse themselves155
because “[i]t is essential to have a public enunciation of the standards by which
the Court reaches its decisions.”156 Written explanations would ensure the
Justices are “abid[ing] by the rule of law and not political influence or
ideology.”157 Written explanations would also provide people “something real
and concrete” from which they can assess whether justice is being achieved,
rather than forcing people to resort to guesswork.158 Finally, written
explanations would lay the foundation for when recusal is appropriate and
facilitate consistent decisions in later cases presenting similar circumstances.159
There are some problems, however, with the suggestion that Supreme
Court Justices publicly disclose why they have recused, or refused to recuse,
themselves. First, requiring Justices to provide an explanation each time they
recuse or refuse to recuse far exceeds the public’s need to know. Justices are
subjected to a public Senate confirmation process in which their personal and
professional backgrounds are examined.160 They are subjected to continuing
mandatory financial disclosures, which are publicly available.161 Supreme
Court Justices are highly visible public figures so it is easy to track their
appearances at events and find out what they might have said. Therefore,
requiring Justices to provide the public with information beyond the vast
amount that is already publicly available is a nuisance. It is also intrusive
because the reasons on which the Justice’s recusal decision is based could be
highly personal or of a sensitive nature, and the Justice’s privacy, or another
person’s privacy, might need to be protected.162 The Justices’ right to maintain

153. Liptak, supra note 99, at A18; see also Tony Mauro, Decoding High Court Recusals,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1 (referring to the “murky world of Supreme Court recusals”).
154. Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
155. See, e.g., H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2011).
156. Roberts, supra note 97, at 169–70.
157. Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy, supra note 6.
158. Cravens, supra note 154, at 5.
159. Goodson, supra note 98, at 216.
160. See CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 10; see generally, BETSY PALMER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31948, EVOLUTION OF THE SENATE’S ROLE IN THE NOMINATION
AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF HISTORY (2008) (describing the history of the Senate’s
role in the confirmation process and the importance of the Senate’s role in evaluating the
candidates).
161. 5 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 101–02 (2000).
162. Kozinski, supra note 45, at 1104–05; Cravens, supra note 154, at 45.
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a modicum of privacy outweighs the benefits of satisfying the public’s
curiosity and establishing precedent.
Second, the information provided in the written explanations will
undoubtedly be monitored by interest groups looking to use disqualification as
a weapon to shape the outcome of litigation.163 However, even if the written
explanations are only used for the benevolent purpose of protecting the
integrity of the Court by assuring the judicial process is impartial, the increased
knowledge of the recusal process provided by the written explanations will
bring increased requests for recusal and an increased workload for the Justices.
If we want the Court to be efficient, we cannot expect the Justices to explain
everything they do.
The biggest problem with written explanations, however, is that while they
sound good in theory, they will be counter-productive in reality, and public
confidence in the Court will actually decrease. The typical, reasonable citizen
has only a rudimentary understanding of the mechanics and realities of the
judicial system in general, much less of the Supreme Court.164 They question
the impartiality of the Justices without considering the wide range of factors
the recusal standard seeks to balance.165 Additionally, “people who have not
served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts
concerning the integrity of judges.”166 As a result, there is a tension between
when people expect Justices to recuse themselves because of an appearance of
potential bias, and when the standard actually calls for recusal.167
For example, a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a Justice who
knows the parties, government officials, or lawyers in front of the Court cannot
be impartial. However, throughout their careers, judges acquire friends, former
colleagues, and former law clerks. Supreme Court Justices, in particular, “hold
the type of credentials that create even more ties over the course of [their]
career such that it would not be unusual to expect connections between the
Justice and the players (both the parties and the law firms) who appear before
the Supreme Court.”168 In fact, many of the elite attorneys who appear in the

163. See infra notes 201–11 and accompanying text.
164. Cravens, supra note 154, at 20 (describing a concern regarding the assumptions of those
unfamiliar with the judicial system).
165. Hearing, supra note 101, at 56 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
Minimizing improper influences on judicial decision-making is not the only goal of the legal
system. Id. The legal system also wants final decisions without recusals that leave the Court split
four to four. Id. The legal system wants to appoint high-quality judges to sit in the place in which
they are from. Id. The legal system does not want to unduly handicap judges’ families in their
own professional lives and it wants judges to be free to continue their social lives and financial
lives. Id.
166. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864–65 (1988).
167. Hearing, supra note 101, at 57 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
168. Roberts, supra note 97, at 153.
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Supreme Court have clerked for the very Justices before whom they are
arguing.169 Additionally, Justice Scalia noted the “well-known and constant
practice of Justices’ [sic] enjoying friendship and social intercourse with
Members of Congress and officers of the Executive Branch . . . .”170 He also
freely admitted that “many Justices have reached this Court precisely because
they were friends of the incumbent President or other senior officials . . . “171
Contrary to what the public may think, the connections between the Justices
and the parties and attorneys who appear in front of the Court are not at odds
with goals of the legal system. It is important that judges continue their social
lives after being appointed to the bench so they are “sufficiently personally
involved in their societies and communities so that they can understand the
experiences of those before them, [and] understand the real life ramifications
of their decisions . . . .”172
Another example is a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a Justice
who has opinions and has made past statements about controversial issues
cannot be impartial when those issue comes before the Court. However, in the
case of Supreme Court Justices, the absence of opinions or comments is more
illustrative of indifference and a lack of qualification, than a lack of bias.173
Most Justices are middle-aged before they are appointed to the Supreme
Court.174 They are “strong-minded” men and women.175 It would be “not
merely unusual, but extraordinary” if Justices had not formulated notions or
expressed opinions regarding constitutional issues they had encountered prior
to taking the bench.176 As one commentator said, “[W]e should not so highly

169. Hearing, supra note 101, at 51 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
170. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 926 (2004).
171. Id. at 916. The relationships between Supreme Court Justices and high-ranking
government officials have existed since the beginning of our Nation. Chief Justice John Marshall,
Justices Thomas Johnson, Joseph Story, and Thomas Todd, Attorney General William Wirt, and
famed constitutional attorney, Daniel Webster, were guests at President John Quincy Adams’
dinner parties. Id. Justice John Marshall Harlan and his wife spent Sunday evenings at the White
House with President Rutherford B. Hayes and his family. Id. at 917. Justice William Douglas
played poker with President Franklin Roosevelt and Chief Justice Fred Vinson did the same with
President Harry Truman. Id. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his wife went to dinner every
week or two at the White House with President Theodore Roosevelt. Id. Justice Byron White
went on a family vacation skiing in Colorado with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Id. at 924. Justice Robert Jackson was a close friend of
Franklin Roosevelt’s and frequently socialized and vacationed with the President. Id. at 925–26.
172. Cravens, supra note 154, at 30.
173. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 836 (quoting John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh
Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 48 (1970)).
176. Laird, 409 U.S. at 835.
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value the appearance (or even the reality) of impartiality that we would require
a judge to come to the bench as a blank slate.”177
A third example is that a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a
Justice whose spouse has publicly spoken about an issue before the Court
cannot be impartial. For example, Virginia Thomas is a very vocal opponent of
the Obama administration’s health care reform law, and many observers
wondered if Justice Thomas could be impartial when the case, which means so
much to his wife, was challenged before the Supreme Court.178 However, we
do not want Justices’ families to be unduly handicapped in their own
professional lives.179 As such, federal law does not bar a Justice from
participating in any matter in which their family members have an ideological
interest.180 Stephen Gillers, one of the nation’s leading ethics experts,
explained, “[a] spouse of a judge can have a full political life and take
positions on political issues and legal issues, even ones that come before his or
her spouse.”181 Steven Lubet, an ethics professor at Northwestern Law School,
agreed and stated, “two-career families are now the norm and there are no
constraints on the political activities of judicial spouses.”182 David Garrow, a
historian at Cambridge University, added that in a democracy, Virginia
Thomas’s public comments are “utterly proper,” if not “utterly commendable.”
183
Justice Thomas also received support from a former colleague; retired
Justice John Paul Stevens stated “I wouldn’t think there’s any possibility that
any of the activities of Mrs. Thomas have had any impact on the analysis of
Judge Thomas.”184
A final example is that a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a
Justice who has been publicly insulted and harshly criticized by an individual
cannot be impartial when that individual comes before the Court. “After all,
judges are human beings who may take umbrage at that and may end up
holding it against the person.”185 However, Canon 14 of the original 1924
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that a judge “should not be swayed by
partisan demands, public clamor or considerations of personal popularity or
notoriety, nor be apprehensive of unjust criticism.”186 We cannot have a system
in which criticism leads to automatic recusal because then “people can just

177. Cravens, supra note 154, at 30.
178. Lubet, supra note 32.
179. Hearing, supra note 101, at 56 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
180. Totenberg, supra note 7.
181. Id.
182. Jackie Calmes, Activism by Thomas’s Wife Could Raise Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2010, at A14.
183. Lisa Miller, Sweet Virginia, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2010, at 37.
184. Barnes, supra note 23, at A16.
185. Hearing, supra note 101, at 51 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
186. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 10.
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judge-shop simply by insulting enough judges.”187 Similarly, we cannot have a
system where the media is given “a veto over participation of any Justices.”188
First, the media “may not be an accurate proxy for public opinion.”189 Second,
the media also tends to generate a controversy where none exists.190 Recusals
based on criticisms and clamoring by individuals and the media would only
“encourage so-called investigative journalists to suggest improprieties, and
demand recusals, for other inappropriate (and increasingly silly) reasons.”191
Therefore, as Chief Justice Roberts explained in his Year End Report, “Such
concerns have no role to play in deciding a question of recusal.”192
The previous four examples illustrate the discrepancy between the
expectations of typical, reasonable citizens and the realities of the legal system.
Written explanations will lead to less confidence in the Court, rather than
more, when people expect a Justice to recuse him or herself and become
confused, disappointed, or outraged when it turns out the standard doesn’t call
for recusal.193 Written explanations will lead to less confidence in the Court
when the public realizes the recusal statute is not clear cut194 and each Justice
is left to personally decide “(a) what evidence of ‘impartiality’ is enough to
trigger recusal, (b) whose ‘questioning’ of the judge’s impartiality is to be
taken into account, and (c) when such questioning is deemed to be
‘reasonable.’”195
III. THE RECUSAL PROCESS IS NOT BROKEN, SO QUIT TRYING TO FIX IT
The Supreme Court recusal process is certainly not perfect, but revising it
is not necessary at this point despite public clamoring to the contrary. It is a
manufactured crisis. Demands that Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas recuse

187. Hearing, supra note 101, at 51 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
188. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 927 (2004).
189. Frost, supra note 10, at 534.
190. Id. at 577. For example, following a 2011 committee hearing, when Rep. Jose Serrano
asked Justices Kennedy and Breyer to share their thoughts on the fact that the Code of Ethics is
not binding on the Supreme Court, the media surmised that Supreme Court Justices do not apply
the Code. Budget Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Serv. and General Gov’t of the H.
Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of H. Rep. Jose E. Serrano), available
at http://appropriations.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=; see No Court Should be
Above the Rules, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/supremecourt-ethics-reform/ (stating that the Code “shockingly” does not apply to the Justices) (last
visited Aug. 31, 2012). But in reality, the Justices do apply the Code and it “plays the same role
for the Justices as it does for other federal judges.” CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 4.
191. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 927.
192. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 10.
193. Hearing, supra note 101, at 57 (statement of Eugene Volokh, Prof. of Law, U.C.L.A.).
194. Cravens, supra note 154, at 6–8 (explaining that the recusal statute does not sufficiently
explain its terms and is “vague at best” in its guidance).
195. Denniston, supra note 20.
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themselves from deciding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act were
not made to protect the integrity of the Court;196 they were partisan attempts to
gain an advantage when the Affordable Care Act came before the Court.
Nonetheless, the demands triggered a general fear that the Supreme Court
recusal process is broken and in need of repair. The reality, however, is that the
recusal process has served our country well for over 200 years.197 As Chief
Justice Roberts noted in his Year End Report, “[t]hroughout our Nation’s
history, instances of judges abandoning their oath ‘to faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform’ the duties of their office have been exceedingly
rare.”198
Health care reform is a politically polarizing issue. Democratic presidents
since Harry Truman have tried and failed to pass health care reform.199 After a
year of bitter partisan combat, President Obama was finally able to do so in
2010.200 It has long been acknowledged that parties may question a Justice’s
impartiality in an attempt to avoid the judge’s adverse decision.201 In
politically charged cases when a party moves to recuse a judge, the odds are
that the party is not simply civic-minded and trying to ensure the judicial
process is fair; the party is trying to shape the legal outcome.202 Typically
Supreme Court cases, particularly those related to abortion, homosexuality,
and affirmative action, are very politically charged.203 The stakes are high, the
impact is broad, the issues are divisive, and the decisions often turn on the vote
of a single Justice.204 In these cases, “you can come up with an accusation of
196. The Supreme Court is not concerned with the demands. See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice
Defends Peers on Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2012), at 1, 22 (explaining Kagan and Thomas
have not crossed an ethical line requiring recusal and suggesting Chief Justice Roberts defended
Kagan and Thomas in his 2011 Year End Report).
197. See generally Totenberg, supra note 7 (explaining that our country’s recusal process has
been in place for as long as there has been a Supreme Court).
198. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 11.
199. Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally Passed, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1112, 1112 (2010).
200. Id.
201. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
202. Denniston, supra note 20.
203. The Diane Rehm Show, supra note 152 (describing the politically charged atmosphere of
Supreme Court cases).
204. Letter from Law Professors, supra note 41. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 and affirmed a woman’s right to an abortion, but broadened the
states’ authority to regulate it. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Bush v. Gore by a vote of 5-4 and essentially determined the outcome of the presidential race. 531
U.S. 98 (2000). Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission was one of the most highprofile cases of the 2009 term and the Court ruled 5-4, striking down limits on corporate and
union spending on political campaigns. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). Partial birth abortion cases,
Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000 and Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007 were each decided by a vote of 5-4.
530 U.S. 914 (2000); 550 U.S. 124 (2007). In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the U.S. Supreme

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

542

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:521

political conflict in almost any of them.”205 Justices often are close friends, or
at the very least socialize, with high-ranking government officials.206 Justices
are aligned with either the Democratic or Republican Party and each president
tries to appoint individuals to the Court whose views on key issues are
consistent with his own.207 And before coming to the bench, Justices have
typically made public comments regarding their stance on constitutional
interpretation and issues facing the nation.208
The demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to disqualify themselves
from hearing the challenges to the Affordable Care Act were likely attempts to
gain an advantage in the litigation.209 “Criticism on ethics issues is often a
proxy for political disapproval with how you expect a justice to vote.”210 In
this case, the political right presumed that Justice Elena Kagan would vote in
favor of the law and called for her recusal, hoping to improve the possibility
that the law would fail.211 Her critics accused her of being too biased to hear
the health care case, claiming that as Solicitor General, Kagan strategized
about the law, advised the Obama administration on the law, and also
expressed opinions on its constitutional merits in violation of the recusal
rules.212 The political left, on the other hand, presumed that Justice Clarence
Thomas would vote to strike down the law, and called for his recusal, hoping
to improve the chances the law would be upheld.213 His critics accused him of
being too biased to hear the health care case because his wife spent significant
time and effort, and earned a great deal of money, lobbying against the law.214
Both sides of the argument knew the Court’s overall credibility was in play and

Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race in considering
admissions. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
205. The Diane Rehm Show, supra note 152.
206. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
207. Does the Supreme Court Follow the People?, supra note 4, at 24–25. For example,
Abraham Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase, a committed abolitionist, to replace Chief Justice
Roger Brooke Taney, the author of the Dred Scott decision. Paul Finkelman, You Can’t Always
Get What You Want . . . : Presidential Elections and Supreme Court Appointments, 35 TULSA L.J.
473, 479 (2000). Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened to “pack” the Supreme Court with
Justices who agreed with his New Deal politics. Samuel R. Olken, Historical Revisionism and
Constitutional Change: Understanding the New Deal Court, 88 VA. L. REV. 265, 266–67 (2002)
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
208. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
209. The Diane Rehm Show, supra note 152.
210. Totenberg, supra note 7.
211. Denniston, supra note 20. Interestingly, if Kagan was still serving as Solicitor General,
she would have defended the Affordable Care Act to the Supreme Court rather than decide its
constitutionality. Barnes, supra note 23, at A1.
212. Barnes, supra note 23, at A16.
213. Denniston, supra note 20.
214. Id.
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accusing Justices of being unethical can be politically powerful and undermine
the credibility of the Court’s decision.215
There are many critics who argue that the calls for Justice Kagan’s and
Justice Thomas’ recusals are indicative of a much larger concern about the
effectiveness of the recusal process generally. However, there is very little
evidence that bias on the Supreme Court is a problem. First, Supreme Court
Justices are well qualified to hold their positions and committed to their duties.
“They are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience.”216 They have been
subjected to a “rigorous appointment and confirmation process,”217 which
tested their character and ensured they were fit to hold a lifetime appointment
to the Court. While on the Court, the Justices continue to follow high ethical
standards and are “deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the
Court’s vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.”218
Professor Charles Geyh explained to the House Committee on the Judiciary
that “it is extremely rare . . . for a judge to willfully refuse to disqualify himself
under circumstances in which the judge knows he must. On the whole . . . our
judges are too committed to impartial justice for any but the isolated bad apple
to do that . . . .”219 Bias has not historically been a problem on the Court,220 and
it seems unlikely it will become a problem in the near future. As Harvard law
professor and Supreme Court historian Noah Feldman said, “Today, with
information moving as fast as it does, it would be very difficult for any justice
to hide any improprieties . . . .”221
Critics of the recusal process have cited declining Supreme Court approval
ratings as evidence the process is broken. Since 2000, public approval “of the
way the Supreme Court handles its job” has fluctuated between a high of sixtytwo percent and a low of forty-two percent.222 The fluctuation, however, is not
because of concern about possible ethical transgressions by the Justices, but is
better explained by broad national discontent and disagreement with politically
controversial decisions by the Court.223 For example, in 2003, after the

215. Totenberg, supra note 7.
216. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 10.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Hearing, supra note 101, at 21 (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Assoc. Dean of Research,
Prof. of Law, Ind. Univ.).
220. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, supra note 82, at 11.
221. Totenberg, supra note 7.
222. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Approval Rating Dips to 46%, GALLUP (Oct. 3,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149906/supreme-court-approval-rating-dips.aspx.
223. Benjamin Wittes, The Supreme Court’s Looming Legitimacy Crisis, BROOKINGS INST.
(June 25, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0625governance_wittes.aspx; Jones,
supra note 222.
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Supreme Court struck down a Texas law making homosexual sex a crime,224
and upheld the affirmative action admissions policy at the University of
Michigan Law School, approval ratings dipped from sixty percent to fifty-two
percent.225 The Court’s approval rating continued to fall in 2005 to an all-time
low of forty-two percent after decisions involving eminent domain,226 medical
marijuana,227 and government displays of religious symbols.228 After a brief
recovery in 2006, the Supreme Court’s approval ratings dipped again in 2007
and 2008 to around fifty percent.229 These lower ratings were attributed to both
a broad decline in public confidence in the Congress, the President, the press,
labor unions, the medical system, and the criminal justice system,230 and the
Court’s controversial ruling upholding the federal law that banned partial-birth
abortion.231
The Supreme Court began its 2011-2012 term with an approval rating of
forty-two percent, the second lowest recorded rating.232 In keeping with the
trend, this low rating has been explained by both a controversial, political
decision by the Court and broad national discontent. The Supreme Court’s
approval rating has been declining since its Citizens United decision in January
2010,233 and the ratings have been unable to rebound amidst “profound
cynicism about our capitalist democracy” and acutely polarized politics.234 The
nation has been at war for over a decade.235 Thirteen million Americans are
unemployed.236 Four million Americans have lost their homes to foreclosure,

224. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
225. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Approval
Rating Best in Four Years, GALLUP (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/24802/
supreme-court-approval-rating-best-four-years.aspx.
226. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
227. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
228. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844 (2005); see Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Gives Supreme Court Passing Grade, GALLUP (Oct. 3,
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/110965/Public-Gives-Supreme-Court-Passing-Grade.aspx.
229. Jones, supra note 222.
230. Wittes, supra note 223.
231. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Joseph Carroll, Slim Majority of Americans
Approve of the Supreme Court, GALLUP (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/28798/
Slim-Majority-Americans-Approve-Supreme-Court.aspx.
232. Jones, supra note 222.
233. See id. (depicting a relatively sudden and drastic decline in the Supreme Court’s
approval rating between early 2010 and late 2011).
234. Dan Rodricks, Justice Breyer, the Supreme Explainer, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 12,
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-10-12/news/bs-ed-rodricks-breyer-20111012_1_jus
tice-breyer-supreme-court-judicial-oath.
235. Rick Hampton, Afghanistan: America’s Longest War, USA TODAY (May 28, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-27-longest-war-afghanistan_N.htm.
236. Editorial, The State of the Union in 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at A28.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

IF IT’S NOT BROKE, DON’T FIX IT

545

and home prices have continued to drop significantly in the last five years237 in
what has been the biggest housing slump since the Great Depression.238
Congress is universally deplored: on average in 2011, only seventeen percent
of Americans approved of the way Congress handled its job, including a low of
eleven percent in December 2011.239 President Obama’s approval ratings have
been consistently among the most polarized for a president in the last sixty
years.240 An average of eighty percent of Democrats approved of the job he
was doing in 2011, while only twelve percent of Republicans approved.241
The roots of current criticisms of the Supreme Court recusal process are
political posturing, an uneasy nation, and controversial decisions by the Court,
not evidence of an actual problem of bias. Therefore, the recusal process
should be left alone. It has been used for two centuries through social
revolutions, political unrest, times of war, and times of prosperity. And the
changes being advocated would fundamentally change the Supreme Court as
an institution. As Russell Wheeler of the Brookings’ Institute stated: “This
may just be a situation we live with because any cure is worse than what we
have now.”242
CONCLUSION
The issue of recusal is extremely important because a fair and impartial
judge is essential to the American notion of justice. While Supreme Court
Justices have always determined for themselves whether or not to recuse, and
their decisions are not reviewable, criticisms of this process have recently
saturated the news. The criticisms, however, are misguided and based on
misunderstandings about Supreme Court Justices. These critics seem to ignore
the historical evidence as the recusal process has been used for over two
centuries and has served our country well. The critics also fail to consider that
“impartiality and diligence are obligations that permeate every aspect of
judicial life—obligations that each [Justice] has the unflagging responsibility

237. Lee Christie, Foreclosures Fall to Lowest Level Since 2007, CNN MONEY (Jan. 12,
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/12/real_estate/foreclosures/index.htm; Press Release, S&P
Indices, Home Prices Continue to Decline in November 2011 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller
Home Price Indices (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/docs/
case-shiller/CSHomePrice_Release_013118.pdf.
238. Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal is Said to be Set for
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1.
239. Frank Newport, Congress’ Job Approval at New Low of 10%, GALLUP (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152528/Congress-Job-Approval-New-Low.aspx.
240. Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama Ratings Historically Polarized, GALLUP (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152222/Obama-Ratings-Historically-Polarized.aspx.
241. Id.
242. Totenberg, supra note 7.
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to police for himself.”243 They downplay that Justice Kagan and Justice
Thomas are the latest targets of “the Washington obsession with turning
substantive disagreements into supposed ethical transgressions” in an attempt
to shape the Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the health care reform
law.244 And they do not acknowledge that Americans are unhappy with
everything these days.
Is the recusal process perfect? No. But neither are the proposed solutions.
Creating a review process for Supreme Court recusal decisions would require
the Justices to sit in judgment of one another, or worse yet, involve violating
the Constitutional mandate of “one supreme Court.” Further, requiring the
Justices to issue written explanations for their recusal decisions would be
intrusive, burdensome, and counter-productive. Justice Scalia said it best when
he told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “I think we can stumble along
the way we are.”245
KRISTEN L. HENKE*

243. Kozinski, supra note 45, at 1106.
244. The Diane Rehm Show, supra note 152.
245. Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of J. Antonin Scalia).
* J.D., Saint Louis University School of Law. Thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor Ann
Scarlett, for her insights and comments; to the staff members and editors of the Saint Louis
University Law Journal for their work in publishing this Comment; and to my family, my friends,
and my other half for helping me survive law school.

